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ABSTRACT 
Emerging infectious diseases are diseases whose incidence in humans have increased in the past decades or threaten to increase 
in the near future. The epidemiological and Laboratory techniques needed to detect, investigate and contain a deliberate 
outbreak are the same as those used for natural outbreaks. The threat to Nigeria posed by the arrival in Lagos of a patient 
acutely ill with Ebola was potentially enormous. Six response teams were deployed within the Emergency  Operations Centre; 
1) Epidemiology/ Surveillance, 2) Case Management/ Infection Control, 3) Social mobilization, 4) Laboratory Services, 5) Point 
of Entry and 6) Management / Coordination. The strategy group reviewed and approved all of the teams work and needed 
resources. Eleven patients with laboratory confirmed Ebola were admitted and discharged, an additional patient was diagnosed 
at convalescent stage while eight patients died. Several issues were observed by the response team during Nigeria Ebola 
outbreak that could in retrospect have been mitigated through additional preparedness planning for public health emergencies:- 
1) Financial resources were slow to arrive, 2) Political leadership did not appreciate the enormous consequences that even a 
small Ebola outbreak could have on civil institutions, 3) Lack of Nigerian health workers willing to care for Ebola because of a 
lack of information and training on how to care for Ebola patients, 4) Inappropriate coordination of private sector engagement 
and 5) Partners and parts of government were unfamiliar with  EOC/IMS system and its use as a means of streamlining 
coordination and response elements into one unified approach. 
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Résumé  
Les maladies infectieuses émergentes sont des maladies dont l'incidence chez les humains ont augmenté au cours des dernières 
décennies ou menacer d'augmenter dans un avenir proche. Les techniques de laboratoire et épidémiologiques nécessaires pour 
détecter, enquêter et contenir une épidémie délibérée sont les mêmes que celles utilisées pour les éclosions. La menace pour le 
Nigéria posés par l'arrivée à Lagos d'un patient gravement malade avec le virus Ebola est potentiellement énorme. Six équipes 
d'intervention ont été déployés dans le centre des opérations d'urgence ; 1) de l'épidémiologie et de surveillance, 2) La gestion 
de cas/ Contrôle de l'infection, 3) la mobilisation sociale, 4) Les Services de laboratoire, 5) le point d'entrée et 6) Gestion / 
Coordination. La stratégie groupe a examiné et approuvé l'ensemble des équipes de travail et les ressources nécessaires. Onze 
patients atteints d'Ebola confirmé en laboratoire ont été admis et déchargée, un autre patient a été diagnostiqué au stade de 
convalescence alors que 8 patients sont morts. Plusieurs questions ont été observés par l'équipe d'intervention pendant le 
Nigeria l'éclosion d'Ebola qui pourrait rétrospectivement ont été atténuées par la planification des mesures supplémentaires 
pour les urgences en santé publique :- 1) ressources financières ont été lentes à arriver, 2) Le leadership politique n'a pas 
apprécié les conséquences énormes que même une petite épidémie d'Ebola pourrait avoir sur les institutions civiles,    
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3) le manque de travailleurs de santé nigérians prêts à s'occuper de l'Ebola en raison d'un manque d'information et de formation 
sur la façon de soigner les patients d'Ebola, 4) Pas de la coordination de l'engagement du secteur privé et 5) Partenaires et parties 
du gouvernement n'étaient pas familiers avec l'EOC/IMS système et son utilisation comme moyen de rationaliser la 
coordination et des éléments de réponse dans l'une approche unifiée. 
INTRODUCTION                                                                     
Emerging infectious diseases are diseases 
that: - 
1. Ebola cases have not occurred in humans before 
(this type of emergence is difficult to establish 
and is probably rare (1),  or 
2. Have occurred previously but affected only small 
numbers of people in isolated places (AIDs and 
Ebola hemorrhagic fever are examples (2); 
3. Have occurred throughout human history but 
have only recently been recognized as distinct 
diseases due to an infectious agent (3).  
Many specialists in infectious diseases include re-
emerging diseases as a subcategory of emerging 
disease (4). An infectious disease emerging in a single 
country is a threat to all countries (5). 
Despite the challenges of emerging and re-emerging 
infectious diseases, the results of basic research, show 
that there is a reason for hope (6).  Acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDs was first described in 
1981,  and it took two years to identify the retrovirus 
that causes it, which named Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (7).  The development 
of polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a powerful new 
research technique allows rapid identification  of 
causative agents of infections (8).  Recommendations 
for avoiding and/or treating of new infectious 
diseases become possible when new techniques, 
developed through basic research are applied to the 
problem of disease emergence (9). 
Ebola Virus Disease 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a severe, potentially life 
threatening illness caused by Ebola virus (10). Ebola 
virus is an enveloped RNA virus about 80x800-1400 
nm in size whose survival is dependent on an animal 
reservoir (11). An international team of researchers 
have sequenced 99 Ebola virus genomes and also 
observed a rapid increase in its genetic variation (9). 
However, more recent molecular data obtained from 
the outbreaks in Kikwit and Gabon did not find any 
molecular evidence for adaptation during human to 
human transmission (12).  Infection results in severe 
disease with high mortality rate among infected 
humans and other primates (13).  I has no known cure 
or vaccine; treatment is only supportive (8).  Ebola 
virus is considered a potential biological weapon 
candidate (11). 
On the 23rd of March 2014, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) issued its first communiqué on 
a new outbreak of EVD, which began in December 
2013 in the republic of Guinea (14).  Located on the 
Atlantic coast of West Africa, Guinea became the first 
country in this geographical region to report an EVD 
outbreak with more than one case reported. The 2014 
Ebola epidemic is the largest in history, affecting 
multiple countries in West Africa (15). 
The Nigeria Ebola Outbreak 
On July 20th 2014, an acutely ill traveler from Liberia 
arrived at the Murtala Mohammed International 
airport in Lagos, Nigeria and was admitted to a 
private hospital (16). Based on the patient’s failure to 
respond to malaria treatment and his travel from an 
Ebola affected country in the region, treating 
Physicians suspected EVD. The patient was isolated 
and tested for Ebola virus infection while local public 
health authorities were alerted about a suspected case 
of EVD (16).  He was later confirmed to have EVD. 
This index patient potentially exposed 72 persons at 
the airport and the hospital (14). The Federal Ministry 
of Health with guidance from the Nigeria Centre for 
Disease Control (NCDC) thereafter, declared an Ebola 
emergency. On July 23rd, the Federal Ministry of 
Health with the Lagos State government and 
International partners activated an Ebola Incident 
Management Centre (IMC) as a precursor to the 
current Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) to 
rapidly respond to this outbreak. On August 8th, the 
WHO declared the epidemic to be a public health 
emergency of International concern (17). 
Port Health Services conducted early contact tracing 
at the airport and worked with airline and partners to 
ensure notification of the outbreak through the 
International Health Regulations mechanisms (18). 
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The EOC case-management team took over the 
management of each laboratory confirmed or 
suspected case, triaged potential patients, and 
decontaminated areas inhabited by them. Patients 
with suspected infection were isolated in suspected 
case ward at the Ebola treatment facilities(9), initially 
in Lagos, Western Nigeria and subsequently in Port 
Harcourt, South east Nigeria. A contact tracing team 
staffed and supervised by skilled, dedicated 
epidemiologists was established to investigate all 
primary contacts and alert the case management team 
of symptomatic contacts for assessments and possible 
reclassification. A suspected case was reclassified as a 
confirmed case if reverse transcription polymerase 
chain reaction (RT-PCR) detected Ebola virus in a 
blood specimen, and was ruled out if RT-PCR testing 
of two blood specimens collected at least 48 hours 
apart was negative.16Additionally, testing for anti-
Ebola virus immunoglobulin G, indicating an immune 
response to Ebola virus, was added to the testing 
protocol for PCR-negative suspected cases in persons 
with some symptoms who were epidemiologically 
linked to subsequent confirmed cases (19). When a 
contact became ill with suspected case, the contact 
tracing team gathered data on persons exposed to that 
contact from the date of symptom onset in the event 
the suspected case should become laboratory 
confirmed (20). Having the capacity to conduct Ebola 
laboratory diagnosis in-country facilitated rapid 
identification of confirmed cases and quick discharge 
of persons with suspected EVD who tested Ebola virus 
negative.  
The Nigeria Response 
The threat to Nigeria posed by the arrival in Lagos of 
a patient acutely ill with Ebola virus infection was 
potentially enormous (21). The implementation of a 
rapid response that made use of the available public 
health assets was the highest priority at the onset of 
the outbreak, as was organizing the response using 
proven structures for the delivery of public health in 
Nigeria.22 Initially, NCDC and the Lagos State Minis 
try of Health established an IMC which served as the 
overall implementing arm of the national response. 
The initial IMC was subsequently recast as the 
national EOC, in line with Incident Management 
Systems (IMS) nomenclature and national structures 
aimed at emergency response. The EOC expanded its 
operations to Rivers state when cases emerged there, 
and oversaw the monitoring of contacts in Enugu 
state with state health officials as part of the early 
outbreak response.22There was a stated expectation 
that all partner organizations, donors and response 
teams would work through the EOC structure, 
reporting to an Incident Manager (IM). In turn, the IM 
would be responsible to deliver accountable and 
transparent results to the NCDC and the Federal 
Ministry of Health. The IM responsible for oversight 
of the response was selected based on IMS experience 
and competency rather than rank in government or 
public service. 
The Nigeria response benefited from the rapid use of 
its national public institution (i.e. NCDC), previous 
outbreak responses such as a major lead poisoning 
response in 2010, and its recent experience with polio 
eradication. In October 2012, responding to the 
declaration by the World Health Organization of 
polio eradication as a  global public health emergency 
and to improve its national response, the Government 
of Nigeria used the IMS  to establish a  national EOC 
as part of a new national emergency plan for the 
global polio eradication initiative. The use of IMS 
through the EOC changed the operational tempo, 
accountability measures and success of the polio 
eradication program. Indicators and dashboard 
(electronic displays of high level indicators for each 
response team monitored at the EOC) were 
developed to increase accountability of the program 
staff and spending. Through the EOC and the Nigeria 
Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training 
Program (NFELTP) polio activities, State health 
systems strengthening and preparedness was 
prioritized.16 
Six response teams were developed within the EOC 
specific to an Ebola response including; 1) 
Epidemiology/Surveillance, 2) Case Management / 
Infection Control, 3) Social Mobilization, 4) 
Laboratory Services, 5) Point of Entry, and 6) 
Management / Coordination (23). Terms of reference 
and priority activities were developed by the strategy 
team to guide each operational team’s work; 
operational teams develop their own staffing list, list 
of materials and financial  needs and a goal oriented 
operational plan (23,24). The strategy group reviewed 
and approved all of the teams work and needed 
resources. Technical partners assigned staff 
throughout the operational teams in technical 
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advisory roles aimed at building the capacity of the 
local teams and ensuring quality work (21). 
The Impact of the Nigeria Response 
The index patient died on July, 25th; as of September 
24th, there were 19 Laboratory confirmed Ebola cases 
and one probable case in two states, with 894 contacts 
identified and followed during the response (25).  No 
new cases had occurred since August 31, suggesting 
that the Ebola outbreak in Nigeria might be 
contained.25 The EOC established quickly and using 
an IMS to coordinate the response and consolidate 
decision making, is largely credited with helping 
contain the Nigeria outbreak early. National public 
health emergency preparedness agencies in the 
region, including those involved in Ebola responses, 
should consider including the development of an 
EOC to improve the ability to rapidly respond to 
urgent public health threats (26). 
The Lessons Learnt 
Several issues were observed by the response team 
during the Nigeria EVD outbreak that could in 
retrospect, have been mitigated through additional 
preparedness planning for public health emergencies 
(27). 
First, financial resources were slow to arrive at the 
EOC, a delay that threatened to impede the rapid 
expansion of containing activities across the response 
(24). National preparedness efforts should consider 
how resources can be quickly made accessible to fund 
the early stage of the response. 
Second, there were discrepancies among the levels of 
political leadership in fully appreciating the 
enormous consequences that even a small Ebola 
outbreak could have on civil institutions such as 
hospitals, airports and public gatherings.16Targeted 
education about the urgent need to fund, staff and 
supply a response effort was provided to political 
leadership and should be considered for 
preparedness efforts elsewhere (27). Similarly, the 
Nigerian public did not have specific information 
about Ebola virus infection and early information 
provided by the press, in advance of official 
information from the health authorities was 
sometimes inaccurate and created a nationwide 
scare.10,26 This scare resulted in some in some persons 
resorting to extreme and sometimes harmful and 
ineffective measures to avoid infection such as 
consuming large quantities of salt water, even in 
places distant from the outbreak. Both issues could 
have been addressed through preparedness activities 
that focused on education and planning, as well as 
explaining Ebola virus infection to the public and 
describing how to respond should Ebola virus arrived 
in Nigeria (28). 
The case management team indicated that early 
efforts to establish an isolation ward were delayed 
due to a lack of Nigerian health care workers willing 
to care for patients with Ebola because of a lack of 
information and training about how to care for Ebola 
virus infected patients without getting infected and 
because care providers had been disproportionately 
impacted by EVD in other affected countries (29). 
Preparedness activities should include orientation 
and training of physicians, nurses and attendants to 
safely provide services with attention to infection 
control procedures and quality EVD treatment at an 
appropriately designed facility. 
Another challenge was ensuring appropriate 
coordination of private sector engagement. The EOC 
system facilitated improved coordination through the 
designation of the Management and Coordination 
Team Lead as the private sector point of contact. 
Finally, some partners and parts of government were 
unfamiliar with the EOC/IMS and its use as a means 
of streamlining coordination and response elements 
into on unified approach. The government led EOC 
process could define opportunities for partners to 
place staff strategically in the national and local 
response efforts and could encourage this through the 
EOC response teams and management system. 
Further, EOC mechanisms should be tested through 
strategic exercises and use in otheremerging infection 
response (17). 
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